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ABSTRACT
In recent years there has been increased debate about the potential for shifting the incidence
of the tax system away from a variety of economic ‘goods’ (i.e. employment, investment, etc
...) and towards environmental ‘bads’ (i.e. pollution emissions, resource extraction, etc ...).
However, in spite of their apparent efficiency, economic instruments have been adopted
relatively less frequently than direct regulation to mitigate environmental damages. One
reason may be that some of the distributional implications of environmental tax reform have
not been adequately recognised and addressed. How the costs and benefits of
environmental policies are distributed in society is critical for their application since this will
play a significant role in determining whether or not a particular measure is likely to be
politically feasible.  Moreover, for a given level of aggregate economic wealth, a
redistribution of resources from richer households toward poorer households will tend to
increase overall social welfare, and vice versa.  While environmental measures should not
be the instrument through which  distributional objectives are realised, their growing
importance means that distributional implications can no longer be ignored, particularly in the
face of increasing economic inequality in many countries.
This report reviews some of the distributional implications of environmental tax reform in the
residential energy, road transport and agriculture sectors.  While some of the most important
distributional issues are related to the direct financial burden of the tax, this study also
reviews some of the other distributional implications.  In particular, it looks at the indirect
effects on goods and services through input-output linkages, the potentially mitigating effects
through different forms of revenue recycling, the distribution of indirect economic effects
such as employment opportunities, as well as the distribution of social and environmental
effects such as personal health and exposure to pollutants.
The paper argues that in many cases the distributional consequences of environmental tax
reform may be distinctly regressive, at least in terms of relative tax burdens. The distribution
of environmental and social consequences are much less readily quantifiable, but in many
cases their effects may be progressive.  However, this depends very much on the sector
affected and the precise form of the reform introduced.  In addition, the revenue raised by
environmental taxes (unlike most other environmental policy measures) provide the means
whereby some of these adverse distributional consequences can be mitigated and even
reversed.  Finally, by addressing market failures and barriers which impact particularly upon
lower-income households some measures which mitigate the adverse distributional effects ofenvironmental tax reform can also improve the economic efficiency of the reform.  Thus, if
designed appropriately, environmental tax reform can meet both  distributional and
environmental objectives in an efficient manner.
On the basis of the evidence reviewed it is concluded that distributional concerns, while
important in many cases, should not prevent or delay the introduction of environmental
taxes. Rather, they should serve as guiding principles in the design of environmental tax
reform not only for their own sake, but also because efficiency objectives and equity
objectives can be complementary in a well-designed package of environmental tax reform.TABLE OF CONTENTS
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The Distributional Effects of Environmental Tax Reform
Nick Johnstone  and Janaki Alavalapati
1
I. Introduction
In recent years there has been increased debate about the potential for shifting the incidence
of the tax system away from a variety of economic ‘goods’ (i.e. employment, investment, etc
...) and towards environmental ‘bads’ (i.e. pollution emissions, resource extraction, etc ...).
(See Repetto 1992 for a discussion.  O’Riordan 1997 provides a more recent review of
some of the issues involved.)  In its most comprehensive form, this has been described as
‘ecological (or environmental) tax reform,’ (ETR) in which the changes are sufficient to bring
about a fundamental restructuring of the economy along less environmentally damaging lines.
To some extent this debate is a logical extension of the economic analysis of environmental
externalities, since economists have long argued for the use of economic instruments
(environmental taxes and permits) against command and control policies as a means of
managing environmental resources (natural resource stocks and environmental quality).  (See
Baumol and Oates 1988.)  This argument is usually made on the grounds of the perceived
relative economic efficiency of the former.  However, in spite of their apparent efficiency,
economic instruments have been adopted relatively less frequently than direct regulation to
mitigate environmental damages. (See OECD 1994a for a review.)
One reason may be that some of the distributional issues involved in a widespread shift in the
incidence of taxation have been neglected.
2  How the costs and benefits of environmental
policies are distributed in society is critical for their application for two related reasons:
•  First, the distribution of costs and benefits will play a significant role in determining
whether or not a particular measure is likely to be politically feasible; and,
 
•  Second, for a given level of aggregate economic wealth, a redistribution of resources
from richer households towards poorer households will tend to increase overall social
welfare, and vice versa.
3
While environmental measures should not be the instrument through which  distributional
objectives are realised, their growing importance means that distributional implications can
no longer be ignored, particularly in the face of increasing economic inequality in many
countries. For instance, in the UK between 1981-1983 and 1991-1993 the percentage
income share of the bottom decile fell from 4.1% to 2.9%, while the figure for the top decile
rose from 21.3% to 26.2%  (Goodman, Johnson and Webb 1997).  The Gini Coefficient,
                                                                
1 Helpful comments from Nick Mabey and Josh Bishop on initial drafts of the paper are gratefully
acknowledged.  Thanks also to Frances Reynolds who assisted in the preparation of the document.
2 This omission is hardly surprising since it was usually assumed that the changes would be marginal.
3 See Boadway and Bruce (1994) for a discussion of the theoretical conditions under which this is likely
to be the case.2
an index of inequality, rose from 0.25 in 1977 to 0.34 in 1993.
4  Thus, besides their relative
efficiency, policy makers need to know the distributional impacts of different instruments
among different groups of people in order to determine whether or not such a policy change
is both feasible and desirable. Moreover, as the use of economic instruments as an
environmental policy tool increases, they will in themselves come to be significant
determinants of the overall distribution of resources within an economy.
Unfortunately, determining the distributional effects of ETR in terms of overall welfare is
exceedingly complex.  This can be illustrated with reference to a petrol tax.  In the first
instance, the tax will affect the relative tax burden for different groups in society.
5  This will
arise both directly through differences in consumption of petrol, and indirectly through the
‘petrol-intensity’ of other goods consumed.  However, a petrol tax will raise significant
revenue, and thus it is important also to examine the incidence of the  benefits from
recycling the revenue generated, whether through decreases in other taxes or increased
public expenditure.  In addition, the incidence of more  indirect economic effects on
different groups may also be important.  For instance, a tax on petrol would probably hurt
those involved in the automobile and ancillary industries (as employees or shareholders). The
incidence of social effects may also vary significantly, with some households benefiting from
reduced noise levels due to lower traffic volume, while other households face restricted
mobility.  And finally, the distributional effects of a petrol tax will also be reflected in the
incidence of environmental damages, such as exposure to pollution.
6
This report reviews these different effects for three sectors: residential energy, private road
transport and agriculture.  These sectors have been chosen because they are generally
regarded as environment-intensive, both in terms of resource use and in terms of pollution
emissions.  (See Table 1.)  They are also important targets of environmental taxes, and are
likely to be increasingly so in the future.  (See OECD 1994a for a review of the application
of environmental taxes by sector.)  And finally, they are sectors in which expenditures by
consumers are quite direct, rather than arising through inputs into other sectors.  This makes
it easier to trace the distributional effects of policy measures aimed at emissions from the
sector. The discussion focuses on differences in the distribution of costs and benefits for
different income and/or expenditure groups.
7
                                                                
4 The Gini coefficient is the ratio of area between the diagonal and the “Lorenz Curve” and the total area
under the diagonal, where the Lorenz Curve traces the cumulative proportion of total income received
by different income groups.
5 If the policy measure is ideal the incidence of the fiscal effects of a tax is just the inverse of the
distribution of responsibility for environmental damages.
6 In some cases, the value of these damages may not be equivalent to the physical level of damages and
it is possible that a measure which is progressive in physical terms would be regressive in value terms.
7 Disaggregation by income class is usually considered an inferior guide to the real relative burden of a
tax, since changes in income may reflect demographic (i.e. age), temporary (i.e. unemployment) or
exceptional (i.e. income windfalls) factors, whereas expenditure tends to be more stable.  Moreover, it is
recognised that supplementary forms of disaggregation (i.e. children, pensioners, single parents) can
cast further light on the issue, and these will be discussed where relevant.3
Table 1
Some Adverse Environmental Effects of Sectors Examined
Agriculture Transport Residential Energy
Air Pollution Greenhouse Gases
Ammonia
Greenhouse Gases, CO,
NOx, PM, Ozone, Lead
Greenhouse Gases
SO2
Water Pollution Nutrients and Pesticides
Resource Use Soil, Water and Fossil
Fuels




Section II reviews some of the experiences countries have had with ETR.  The distribution
of fiscal effects is then reviewed in Section III.  In Section IV the distribution of some of the
most important environmental and social effects is reviewed.  Section V will discuss the
means whereby the twin objectives of efficiency and equity can be reconciled, and Section
VI summarises the arguments presented.  These arguments can be summarised as follows:
•  In some (but by no means all) cases the distributional consequences of ETR may be
distinctly regressive, at least in terms of relative tax burdens.
 
•  The revenue raised by environmental taxes (unlike other environmental policy measures)
provide the means whereby some of these adverse distributional consequences can be
mitigated and even reversed.
 
•  The distribution of environmental and social consequences are much less readily
quantifiable and depend very much on the sector affected and the precise form of the
reform introduced.
•  In many cases, by removing market failures and barriers which have a particular impact
on lower-income households expenditure patterns in environment-intensive sectors,
distributional and environmental objectives can be complementary.
On the basis of the evidence reviewed it is concluded that distributional concerns, while
important in many cases, should not prevent or delay the introduction of environmental
taxes.  Rather, they should serve as guiding principles in the design of ETR, not only for their
own sake, but also because efficiency objectives and equity objectives can be
complementary in a well-designed package of ETR.
II. Environmental Tax Reform: Examples and Extent
To provide a background for recent discussions of environmental tax reform, it is helpful to
review the case for economic instruments more generally. Such reforms can take a variety of
forms and this section also looks at the various  measures which can be classified as
environmental taxes.  Finally, the section reviews the extent of ETR in OECD economies at
present.4
II.A The Case for Environmental Taxes
Environmental policy instruments can be broadly divided into two groups: economic
instruments such as emission taxes and tradeable permits; and direct regulation such as
technology-based controls and emission standards.  As noted above, the perceived
superiority of market-based policies relative to direct regulation is a recurrent theme in the
literature on environmental policy.  This belief rests upon a number of related propositions:
8
•  Since the marginal costs of reducing pollution will vary across sources, controls
which mandate equivalent reductions or specific abatement equipment for all
emitters will be more costly than a market-based policy which allows individual firms
to equate the marginal costs and benefits of reducing emissions.
•  It is often argued that monitoring and enforcement costs are lower for economic
instruments than for direct regulation.  This arises from the fact that the response of
firms to a market-based measure will itself elicit information on the costs of
abatement and mitigation, facilitating the regulator’s role.  This is not true of many
forms of regulation such as emission controls.
•  Direct regulation is purported to be even less cost-effective when dynamic effects
are taken into account.
9  While the benefits of technological innovation which
mitigate environmental damages do not accrue to innovators under many forms of
regulation (i.e. technology-based controls), under a market-based regime the firm
itself is able to capture the benefits.
•  Finally, given the fiscal constraints faced by many countries, the different effects of
alternative instruments on the public purse must also be recognised.  A revenue-
raising environmental policy instrument - such as taxes or some forms of permit
allocation - may be attractive relative to direct controls which often involve
increased public spending due to their costs of implementation.
10
As noted, this report focuses on particular kinds of economic instruments (i.e. taxes).
However, as will be discussed below, even within this classification there are a wide variety
of instruments which can be applied.
11
                                                                
8 See Baumol and Oates (1988), Tietenberg (1990) and OECD (1994a) for discussions and some empirical
evidence.
9 As far back as the mid-1970s it was pointed out that ‘over the long haul, perhaps the most important
single criterion on which to judge environmental policies is the extent to which they spur new
technology towards the efficient conservation of environmental quality.’ (Kneese and Schultz 1975).
10 These costs are also incurred with tax measures, but in most cases they will not exceed the revenue
obtained.
11 This study does not look at the effects of subsidies (i.e. negative taxes).  However, many of the
arguments presented and evidence provided have direct analogies in cases where existing subsidies are
removed.5
II.B The Nature of Environmental Tax Reform
Defining environmental tax reform precisely is difficult since the application of such measures
is far from straightforward in practice.  Many pollution emissions are of the non-point source
type (e.g. some agriculture sector effluents).  In such cases it is difficult to measure the
quantity of pollutant output and design pollutant-based effluent taxes on this basis.  In a
related vein, monitoring costs of many forms of pollution emission are prohibitively expensive
(e.g. some transport sector emissions).  In addition,  the damages associated with many
emissions depend crucially upon the characteristics of the receiving environment (e.g. SO2
emissions).  Finally, many emissions have synergistic effects with other pollutants (e.g.
VOCs and NOx generating ozone), further complicating the application of environmental
taxes.  Given these and other issues, the application of an ‘ideal’ environmental tax is an
exception, even amongst the sub-set of incentive-based environmental instruments which are
applied at present.
Notwithstanding these difficulties, the following list provides a general overview of some of
the measures which would tend to be classified as environmental taxes. (See EEA 1996,
Gee 1997, OECD 1996, and Gale 1995. Box 1 gives more details on measures applied
specifically to the agriculture sector.)
•  Emission and effluent taxes which are targeted directly at the source of
environmental damages. Examples include taxes on ozone-depleting chemicals tax
(Austria, Australia, Denmark, USA), nitrogen oxides charges (Sweden), acidifying
air emissions tax (France), and water effluent charges (Australia, Canada, Germany,
Portugal, Spain, US).
•  Disposal and waste taxes which are targeted at the unwanted by-products of
production processes.  Examples include the landfill levy (UK, Denmark, France,
Germany, Belgium, Netherlands, Australia, Italy) and charges on hazardous waste
(Austria, Belgium, Finland, US).
•  Input taxes which are targeted at inputs to production which are closely associated
with particular environmental damages. Examples include carbon taxes
(Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Denmark), fertiliser charges (Austria, Finland,
Norway, Sweden, US), battery charges (Canada, Denmark, Portugal, Sweden),
packaging charges (Canada, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, US), ),
and charges on lubricant oil (Finland, France, Italy, Norway, US).
•  Tax differentiation and allowances which distinguish between goods or inputs with
different environmental impacts. Examples include higher taxes on leaded fuels (most
OECD countries), vehicle excise duties adjusted according to vehicle characteristic
(Italy, Sweden, Germany and a number of other European countries), and the
renewable energy tax credit (US).
•  Charges and fees which are levied on the use of services with significant
environmental impacts. Examples include water charges (most OECD countries),6
municipal waste user charges (Finland, US), user charges of sewerage (most OECD
countries).
Box 1
Given this wide range of measures, the extent to which a particular instrument may be
considered an environmental tax is ambiguous.
II.C The Extent of Environmental Tax Reform
Environmental Taxes in the Agriculture Sector
Country Tax Particulars
Austria A tax on fertiliser use has been levied since 1986. Current rates are Sch 5
(approximately 24 pence) per kg of nitrogen, Sch 3 (15 pence) per kg of
phosphate, and Sch (7 pence) per kg of potassium. The tax revenue in 1990 and
1991 was about Sch 1 billion (approximately £65 million in current terms).
Finland Tax on phosphate fertilisers levied at 1.5 Markka (approximately 18 pence) from
1991. Since 1988 a tax of 2.5 % is levied on the net selling price of pesticides.
Sweden Since 1988 a tax on both nitrogen and phosphate fertilisers has been levied. As
from 1994, the rate is Skr 1.60 (13 pence) per kg of nitrogen and Skr 30 (24
pence) per gram of cadmium. A pesticide charge is levied at Skr 20 per kg of
active substance.
Belgium A tax on manure surplus to farm requirements has been levied since 1991 by the
Flemish region.
Denmark Retail sale of pesticides sold in containers less than 1 kg or 1 litre is subject to a
tax. For imports the rate is 20% of the producer price. Pesticides sold in larger
quantities are subject to a tax of 3% of the wholesale price.  A new fertiliser tax is
proposed for 1999.
Netherlands A tax is levied on the production of animal manure. The tax rates are based on the
weight of phosphate produced on the farm per hectare per year.  It is set at the
rate of Dfl 0.25 (approximately 8 pence) per kg for farms that produce 125-200kg
of phosphate per hectare per year and Dfl 0.5 (15 pence) per kg for farms
producing more than 200kg per hectare. Farms that produce less than 125kg of
phosphate per hectare per year are exempted from the tax.
Norway Taxes on fertilisers and pesticides have been in place since 1988. The fertiliser tax
is paid by the wholesalers. The rates in 1994 were Nkr 1.21 (approximately 12
pence) per kg content of nitrogen and Nkr 2.30 (approximately 23 pence) per kg
content of phosphorus. In 1994 the tax revenue was approximately Nkr 165 million
(£16.3 million). The pesticides tax is paid by the pesticides importers. The tax rate
is 13% of the wholesale price. In 1994 the tax revenue was approximately Nkr 22
million (£2.2 million).7
Notwithstanding the difficulties arising from definitional issues, efforts have been made to
quantify the extent of environmental taxation in OECD countries.  According to one review
of the origins of government tax receipts, most countries collect between 7% and 9% of
their total revenue from ‘environmental’ taxes (Gee 1997). The European Environment
Agency (1996) estimates that the share of taxes on energy and the environment relative to
total taxes in the EU in 1993 was 5.2% and 1.5% respectively.  The OECD (1996)
reviewed the extent of ETR in Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden,
finding a range of 5.4% (Finland) to 10.8% (Norway) of total tax revenue.
Given the discrepancies in definitions applied, evidence on changes over time in the extent of
environmental taxation may be a more useful indicator than absolute levels.  The OECD
(1996) recently reported a general increase in the proportion of government revenue raised
by ‘environmental’ taxes in three countries (Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) over the
period 1980-1993, while trends elsewhere were approximately constant (Denmark) or
showed an appreciable decline (Finland).  Over the same period, in the EU as a whole
(EEA 1996), there has been a slight increase in the  relative tax burden on energy, but not
on the environment.
Thus it appears that the proportion of the total tax burden which falls on the environment is
modest even in those countries which have been leaders in the introduction of environmental
measures.  One reason for the apparent reluctance of governments to go further may have
been concerns about the impact of environmental policies on competitiveness.  (See Barker
and Johnstone 1998 for a discussion of carbon taxation and international competitiveness.)
Nevertheless, the burden of tax on the environment does seem to have increased in recent
years and is likely to continue to increase in future.
III. The Distribution of the Financial Effects of Environmental
Taxation
A key issue in assessing the impact of environmental tax reform is how it affects different
groups in society. Looking first at financial effects, one can distinguish three avenues by
which environmental taxes will affect different groups: the direct and indirect effects of
environmental taxes on consumer goods markets; the effects of behavioural responses to
price changes; and, the effects of recycling the revenue generated. These different impacts
are illustrated here by a review of taxes on petrol, domestic fuel, carbon/energy, and
agricultural inputs.
III.A Expenditures on Environmentally-Sensitive Goods by Income Group
Widespread concern about the potentially regressive impact of many environmental taxes
arises largely from the observation that lower-income households tend to devote a larger
proportion of their household budget to those goods and services which are directly affected
by environmental tax reform.  The evidence for this claim will be examined for the three
sectors (energy, transport, and agriculture) in turn.
Spending on Energy8
Using expenditure deciles as the means of comparison (i.e. dividing the total population into
ten segments of equal size grouped by expenditure levels), Figure 1 shows the share of total
spending on residential fuel and power by expenditure decile in the UK in 1995-1996  (UK
ONS 1996). This shows an appreciable decline in the share of gas, electricity and ‘other’
(i.e. solid and oil) energy carriers in total expenditure as average spending power increases.
Thus, while the lowest decile devotes over 10% of total spending to fuel and power,  the
richest decile devotes less than 4% to the same purpose.
Figure 1





































This pattern appears to hold elsewhere.  For instance, Poterba (1991) found that in the mid-
1980s 7.6% of total expenditures for the lowest expenditure decile of American households
went on fuel while the equivalent figure for the highest decile was 4.0%. Similarly, Smith
(1992) found that in five of six EU countries examined in 1991 (Spain, Italy, Netherlands,
France and Germany) domestic fuel expenditures as a proportion of total expenditures in the
lowest quartile were 2-3% higher than for the highest quartile. Ireland exhibited an even
more significant decline in the share of spending on domestic fuel in total household
expenditures, from almost 11% of total expenditure for the lowest quartile to approximately
5% for the highest quartile. (See Figure 2.)
Figure 29







































In this context, it is not surprising that one of the most controversial ‘environmental’ taxes
was a proposal by the last Conservative (UK) government to raise VAT on domestic fuel.
Indeed, it was largely on social and  distributional grounds that the tax was ultimately
defeated in Parliament.
12  However, prior to its defeat Crawford, Webb and Smith (1993)
estimated the potential effects of the introduction of 17.5% VAT on domestic fuel in the
UK.  They found that the lowest income quintile would have faced additional indirect tax
payments equal to 2.0% of total expenditures, while the richest quintile would have paid an
additional 0.6% of their total expenditures on higher tax.  Pensioners would have been hit
particularly hard.  The lowest income quintile of pensioners would have paid over 50% more
than non-pensioners in the lowest-income quintile.
Moreover, in the event that taxes on domestic fuel were targeted directly at the
environmental characteristics of the fuel, the effects would tend to be even more regressive,
as poorer households tend to use fuels which are more carbon- and, to some extent,
sulphur-intensive.  In the 1980s in the UK, 77% of households in the richest income quartile
used the ‘cleanest’ fuel (gas) as their primary heating source, while only 63% of the poorest
quartile did so. Conversely, 15% of the poorest quartile used the ‘dirtiest’ fuel (coal) and
only 9% of the richest did so (UK DOE 1991).
Spending on Transport
                                                                
12 And, in fact, subsequently lowered by the incoming Labour government to 5%, which was well below
the average rate on other goods and services.10
The pattern of transport expenditures is rather different.  Once again using UK data, Figure
3 shows the generally rising trend in proportional expenditure per  decile, as total
expenditures increase.  Most significantly in environmental terms, the share of fuel
expenditures rises from 2.0% to 4.3% for the second highest decile, before falling to 3.3%
for the richest decile.  Taking fuel and vehicle purchases together, the proportion rises until
the seventh  decile and then falls for the last three. Thus, taxes on vehicles and/or fuels
appear to be relatively progressive.  Expenditures on bus and rail are approximately
proportional by expenditure decile (between 1.0% and 1.4%).
Figure 3











































The breakdown of petrol expenditures in other countries shows the same general tendency
as in the UK.  For instance, Casler and Rafiqui (1993) find that in the United States gasoline
expenditures rise from 4.5 % of total expenditures for the lowest quintile to 5.1% for the
fourth quintile, before falling appreciably to 3.9 % for the richest quintile.  In continental
Europe in 1991 (Figure 4) relative expenditures on motor fuels of the poorest quartile are
less than those of the other quartiles in all six of the countries examined (Smith 1992).  The
average ratio of proportional expenditures by the richest and lowest quartiles is 1.73.
Figure 411









































Prior to many of the recent increases in petrol duties, Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990)
reviewed the effects of the imposition of a tax of 55 pence per litre on petrol. They found
that the effects were approximately proportional across income levels for car-owning
households, but distinctly progressive across all households. Similarly, taxes on vehicles
themselves are also not thought to have distributionally adverse consequences.
This result is hardly surprising given that the rate of car ownership among households in the
lowest income decile was 18.2%, while the richest decile had a car ownership rate of
97.5%.  Moreover, over 70% of the latter had more than one vehicle (UK ONS 1996).
Thus, a tax on vehicles is likely to have similarly progressive distributional consequences,
although this will depend upon the relative intensity of car use for different socio-economic
groups and the relative frequency of vehicle purchases.  Other vehicle-related environmental
measures which are more closely related to emission levels have more ambiguous effects.
For instance, Ferguson and Taylor (1996) review the effects of ‘Green’ vehicle excise duties
in Europe and find that a scheme based on engine size is likely to be progressive, while one
which is based on vehicle age is likely to be regressive (at least for car-owning households).
This finding  is a reflection of the characteristics of the cars owned by different income
groups, ie richer households tend to buy new cars.
Spending on Agricultural Products
It has long been observed that poor households spend a higher proportion of their income
on food than rich households do. The percentage expenditures on food by income groups
for the UK, US and Canada are shown in the Table 2. For the poorest 10% in the UK,
food and non-alcoholic drinks account for 25.2 % of total weekly expenditures. For the
richest 10%, on the other hand, these items account for only for 15.1% of weekly
expenditures. Similarly, households with lower incomes in both the US and Canada will
spend a greater proportion of their income on food.12
Table 2





















Decile 1 25.2 4.9 or less 36.9 Quintile 1 19.1
Decile 2 24.6 5 - 9.9 34.8 Quintile 2 16.0
Decile 3 22.1 10 - 19.9 24.2 Quintile 3 13.7
Decile 4 20.8 20 - 29.9 21.0 Quintile 4 12.1
Decile 5 19.7 30 - 39.9 17.3 Quintile 5 10.1
Decile 6 18.3 40 - 49.9 13.6
Decile 7 18.5 50 - 69.9 11.9
Decile 8 17.2 70 over 8.5
Decile 9 16.9
Decile 10 15.1
Sources: UK ONS (1998), US DA (1996), StatsCan (1992).
It is generally assumed that environmental tax reform in the agriculture sector would entail a
rise in food prices, due to increased production costs.  Simulating the effects of a 5% rise in
the price of all foods in the UK, Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) find that the tax burden
is somewhat regressive, with the poorest decile paying 0.31% of their total expenditures in
increased tax payments, while all other deciles paying between 0.26% and 0.28%.  Not
surprisingly, households with no children are less adversely affected than households with
children.
However, it would be exceedingly incautious to use such a policy scenario to evaluate the
distributional consequences of ETR in the agriculture sector, since most measures are likely
to be targeted at specific environmental impacts (i.e. from chemical pesticide or fertiliser use,
or from water consumption) which may differ widely by food type. For instance, comparing
recorded sectoral pollution “incidents”
13 in the UK with relative expenditures by the bottom
and top income deciles confirms that measures targeted more closely at the “environment-
intensity” of different crops would be regressive.
14  (See Table 3.)  Indeed, relative to an
environmental measure which targeted all foods equally, it would appear to be even more
regressive, with lower-income households spending a relatively higher proportion than
average in those food groups responsible for pollution incidents.
                                                                
13 For non-point sources such as emissions and effluent from the agriculture sector it is common to use
“incidents” (discrete events) as a measure of pollution-intensity rather than emission rates, due to the
difficulties in monitoring pollutants directly.
14 Arable crops and mixed crops were responsible for 6% and 4% of “incidents”  respectively but it is
difficult to trace them directly to different food groups.13
Further light can be cast on this issue by hypothesising a measure which increased the cost
of pesticide application.  In the UK, fruits tend to be the most pesticide-intensive crops,
often requiring as many as 20 separate applications (WWF/CPRE 1996).  In 1995-1996
fruits represented 5.96% of total food expenditures of the lowest-income decile in the UK,
and 7.31% for the highest-income decile, indicating significant progressivity.  However, as a
proportion of total expenditures, the figure is 1.25% for the lowest decile and 0.66% for the
highest decile (UK ONS 1996).  Thus, even if the environmental measure introduced hits
foods to which the rich devote a greater share of their food budget, there is still a
considerable degree of regressivity in terms of the impact on total household spending.
Table 3
Pollution "Incidents" and Expenditure Patterns in the UK Agriculture Sector
Expenditures
(£/HH/Week)
As % of Food
Expenditures





D1 D10 D1 D10 D1 D10
Dairy 55% 3.08 8.60 16.68% 15.18% 3.51% 1.38%
Pig 7% 0.75 1.97 4.06% 3.48% 0.85% 0.32%
Poultry 2% 0.74 2.89 4.01% 5.10% 0.84% 0.46%
Sheep 2% 0.31 0.91 1.68% 1.61% 0.35% 0.15%
Source: "Incidents” from WWF-UK/CPRE 1996 and Expenditures from UK ONS (1996)
Moreover, poorer households tend to consume rather more of those crops which are not
particularly water-intensive (i.e. potatoes) and less of those which are (i.e. fruit).  For
instance, Tsur (1993) found that the water-intensity (irrigation only) of potatoes was 75%
that of vegetables and only 18% that of citrus fruits.  Comparing this with expenditure
patterns by food type suggests that ETR in the agriculture sector which increased the price
of water for farmers would not necessarily be as regressive as is often assumed.
Indirect Expenditures
Imputing the relative incidence of ETR on different groups solely from such direct
expenditure shares would be incautious.  Attention must also be paid to the environment-
intensity of inputs used in the production of goods and services which are affected by any
taxes introduced.  This is particularly the case for energy taxes, which not only affect direct
expenditures on fuel,  but also non-fuel consumption patterns as well as the energy-intensity
of inputs used in the production of all goods. This in turn reflects the importance of energy in
all sectors of the economy.
The importance of these indirect impacts is illustrated in Table 4, which presents the carbon-
intensity of commodity groups in the UK disaggregated in three senses:
•  Direct Consumption - e.g. emissions arising from the direct consumption of fuels used by
household appliances or vehicles;
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•  Direct Production - e.g. emissions arising from the manufacture of vehicles and
appliances; and,
 
•  Indirect Production - e.g. emissions arising from the manufacture of steel used in the
production of vehicles and appliances.
 
Table 4








Household Energy 5.57 5.61 0.98 12.15
Petrol 5.05 0.23 0.06 5.33
Personal Services 0.00 0.25 2.24 2.49
Vehicle Repairs 0.00 0.22 1.89 2.11
China & Glassware 0.00 0.58 0.72 1.31
Public Transport 0.00 1.12 0.15 1.27
Taxis & Car Hire 0.00 0.72 0.28 1.00
Source: Symons, Proops and Gay (1994).
While fuels remain the most carbon-intensive commodities, other goods (i.e. china and
glassware) and services (i.e. personal services), which have no direct consumption-related
emissions, nevertheless exhibit very high emissions in production (direct and indirect).
Significantly, public transport is quite high (although low relative to private motoring),
revealing the environment-intensity of mobility generally.
Taking these factors into account, the  distributional effects of an energy tax are quite
different than would appear to be the case from a comparison of direct consumption
expenditures.  For instance, Casler and Rafiqui (1993) compare the direct and indirect
effects of an energy tax in the United States.  While a tax on final consumption would have
significantly regressive effects, this is less true if indirect effects are considered also.  Thus,
proportional direct expenditures on fuel are 26% lower for the highest expenditure quintile
relative to the lowest quintile, but only 6% lower when indirect expenditure is included.
Despite the mitigating effects of including indirect expenditures on energy, it is generally
found that energy taxes remain somewhat regressive.  Poterba (1991) examined the effects
of a $100 per ton carbon tax in the United States and found that the incidence of the tax
was equal to an average of 3.7% of total expenditures for the three lowest deciles, but only
2.6% for the three highest quintiles.
15  Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) examine the effects
of a carbon tax sufficient to reduce total UK emissions by 20% (£240.50), and find that the
Gini Coefficient increases from 0.386 to 0.397. Cornwell and Creedy (1996) conduct a
similar exercise for Australia and find that effects are also regressive, but slightly less so than
in the case of the UK.
                                                                
15 The results are even more startling relative to income (i.e. 10.0% and 3.7%).15
One of the few studies to attempt to determine the full direct and indirect effects of more
general environmental policies is Robison (1985), which looks at the relative cost burdens of
American pollution control policies.  He finds that low-income households paid as much
1.09% of their income on industrial pollution abatement (directly and indirectly), while high
income households paid as little as 0.218%.  In a somewhat dated study  Gianessi  et al
(1979) reached similar conclusions. However, in both studies the policies examined included
both taxes and direct controls.
III.B Behavioural Responses to Price Changes by Income Group
While the level of expenditures on those goods and services whose prices rise following the
introduction of environmental taxes is clearly the most important determinant of the
distributional effects of the reform, it is also important to examine how households respond
to changes in prices.  Relative pre-tax expenditure levels (direct and indirect) will tend to
overstate the financial burden for all households since they will tend to substitute away from
goods whose prices have increased.  The more formal studies cited above tend to include
behavioural responses by households to changing prices.  This is important since if demand
is less elastic (i.e. households are less responsive) for those goods which are consumed in
greater proportion by lower-income households, then the tax will be more regressive (in
financial terms) than in cases where households respond more elastically.
This issue can be explored in greater detail with reference to agriculture. Recent American
estimates reported in Table 5 from Huang (1996) indicate that the price elasticities (%
change in expenditures for a percentage change in price) of various food categories are less
than one. This suggests that food consumption is not particularly responsive to changes in the
prices of food products.  However, in the event that ETR in the agriculture sector affects
different food items differentially - i.e. pesticide-intensive crops like fruits and vegetables -
then there may be some substitution possibilities between food groups.  (This issue is
explored in greater detail in Section IV.B.)16
Table 5
Own-Price Elasticities Of Selected Food Items in the US

















Source: Huang (1996). * indicates statistical significance at least at the 5% confidence level.
Another important factor not usually addressed in the empirical studies is difference in the
degree of substitution possibilities which exists for particular environment-intensive goods by
income group.  In the event that the price elasticity of demand for environment-intensive
goods is lower for low-income households, then the regressive distributional effects of the
tax will be even more pronounced than has usually been estimated. In general, there are
good reasons to believe that lower-income households will tend to be more constrained in
their choices for certain goods (and thus have lower price elasticities) since they face more
obstacles in the marketplace.
This can be illustrated with reference to demand for household fuels.  Firstly, it is important
to recognise that fuels are not demanded in and for themselves, but rather as a means of
providing an energy service.  For instance, in the case of space heating it is dwelling warmth
which is the energy service, and it is produced jointly by the fuel, the heating appliance, and
the thermal characteristics of the dwelling.  Thus, in the face of changing absolute and
relative fuel prices the household's reaction is not reflected purely in terms of the quantity of
fuel consumed since there are other means by which a household can achieve a given level
of warmth.  However, the structure of the market is such that high-income households may
be better able to substitute other inputs (i.e. change their appliances, substitute other fuels, or
increase insulation levels) in the face of rising fuel prices. In such cases the price-elasticity of
demand for fuel used in heating the home would tend to be higher for them than it is for
lower-income households.
There are many reasons why this may be so due to the existence of market failures or
barriers which particularly affect lower-income households.
16  On the one hand, since the
                                                                
16See Barker and Johnstone (1993), and Brechling and Smith (1994) for discussions.17
initial costs of reducing heat loss or switching fuels can be quite significant, low-income
households are less likely to undertake such investments because of inadequate access to
savings and/or credit.
17  Indeed, even at prevailing fuel prices capital constraints appear to
be significant, despite the high returns which exist for many measures.  For instance, the
return on investment for loft insulation is often in excess of 30%. (See Barker and Johnstone
1993.) However, in 1991 many low-income households had not invested in insulation.  (See
Figure 5 which gives insulation ownership by income bracket in £1000s.)
18  This can
certainly be attributed in part to the fact that access to loans is often restricted for low-
income households relative to the credit risk they actually pose.
Figure 5



































































On the other hand, given that low-income households are much more likely to be tenants
than high-income households, their incentive to undertake such investment is correspondingly
lower. Whereas 20.4% of households in the UK in the lowest total expenditure bracket
(less than £100/week) were owner-occupiers in 1991, the figure for the highest income
bracket (more than £550/week) was 93.3% (CSO 1992).  Since landlords are usually
responsible for capital costs and tenants are responsible for running costs, neither party is
                                                                
17 It has been estimated that the cost of self-installation of cavity wall insulation and loft insulation is
about £300-£500 and £110-£160 respectively for a terraced house. Double glazing may cost anywhere
from £120-£600 depending on the number of windows, while draught-proofing may cost as much as £60.
Moreover, the cost when such work is undertaken by professional contractors can be as much as twice
that of self-installation (UK DOE 1993). The cost of installing an efficient gas-fired condensing boiler for
a small dwelling was estimated to be between £400 and £600 more than a standard central heating boiler
(UK DOE 1993). An efficient off-peak electric storage boiler is estimated to cost between £2,500 and
£3,000 (UK EEO 1990). These figures are clearly beyond the means of most low-income households.
18 Note that the figure for loft insulation only includes households with lofts.18
likely to have sufficient incentive to invest in home heat retention  improvements and fuel
substitution which involve high capital costs but result in lower running costs.
19
Using the Standard Assessment Procedure of energy efficiency rating,
20 the DOE’s English
House Conditions Survey, reports that energy efficiency for owner-occupiers was
markedly higher (SAP rating 37.2) than private tenants (SAP rating 22.4) in 1991 (UK
DOE 1996).  In a formal study, Brechling and Smith (1994) find that investments in loft
insulation, wall insulation and double glazing are significantly related to housing tenure, with
owner-occupiers being much more likely to undertake such investment.  While capital
constraints may also be important - i.e. income levels are positively and significantly related
to the probability of undertaking such investments - the relationship is not as strong and there
are a number of alternative hypotheses which would support such a relationship.
Thus, in general, it would appear that there is a positive relationship between the heat
retention characteristics of housing and income levels.  The  DOE’s  English House
Condition Survey  found that lower-income households were much more likely to live in
energy inefficient dwellings (UK DOE 1996. See Figure 6). This relationship between
energy efficiency and income/socio-economic status has significant consequences in terms of
the distribution (and, more generally, welfare) effects of a carbon/energy tax, since relatively
more fuel is required to achieve a given level of warmth for low-income households.  (This
issue is explored in Section IV.B below.)
Figure 6














































                                                                
19 A third possible market failure which is frequently cited is related to information. However, its effects
on household energy systems do not appear to be systematically related to income levels.
20 The SAP rating is a logarithmic scale which varies from 1 (highly inefficient) to 100 (highly efficient),
and measures both the rate of heat loss (principally thermal efficiency) and the cost of supplying the
heat (principally conversion efficiency).19
While the discussion in this section has focused on taxation of residential energy, the general
argument is true for a wide variety of goods which are likely to be affected by environmental
tax reform.  For instance, low-income households which own cars may be less able to
substitute their car for a more efficient model in the face of rising fuel prices.  However, since
the ratio of transport fuel costs to vehicle costs is much lower than the ratio of domestic fuel
costs to insulation or boiler costs, this problem is likely to be much less acute. Moreover,
since low-income households often do not own cars, this issue will only affect a subset of
households, such as those who do not have access to adequate public transport in rural and
suburban areas.
More importantly, emphasis on these short-term effects is somewhat misguided in a sector
such as transport where the infrastructure is very long-lasting.  In the longer run it may well
be that measures such as petrol taxes increase mobility, even for car-owning households.
There are two reasons why this is so: first, measures such as petrol taxes are likely to make
public transport projects more viable in a financial sense as passengers substitute away from
car use; and, second, it is quite likely that any ETR which significantly increases petrol prices
will be accompanied by more far-reaching policy changes which encourage investment in
public transport options.  Therefore, access to transport options for some low-income
households may actually rise following the introduction of ETR in the sector.
III.C Revenue Recycling and Mitigating Policies
As noted above, in most discussions of the effects of introducing environmental taxes it is
implicitly assumed that the tax is not of sufficient economic importance to warrant a broader
package of fiscal reform. However, given the magnitude of revenue raised under many of the
environmental taxes discussed, this assumption is both unnecessarily restrictive and politically
implausible. Moreover, since the means by which the revenue is recycled may have at least
as significant distributional consequences as the tax itself, in this section these issues will be
explored.
The potential for environmental taxes to raise revenue can be illustrated from some of the
discussions of the potential fiscal repercussions of a carbon tax. For instance, using a
macroeconomic model of the UK economy (Barker, Baylis and Madsen 1993) it has been
estimated that the proposed CEC tax would have raised approximately  ,5 billion in revenue
in 1995 rising to  ,12 billion in 2000.  Pearson and Smith (1991) estimated that the tax
would have raised approximately 3% of EU governments’ total tax receipts, with the
proportions being greater than 4% for some of the member countries (Greece and
Luxembourg).  Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) estimate that a carbon tax sufficient to
reduce UK CO2  emissions by 20% (£240) would increase revenue by 47.7% if there were
no other policy changes.  Finally, Poterba (1993) estimates that a carbon tax of $100/ton
would generate revenue in the region of $200 billion (3% of GNP) in the United States.
Given the pervasiveness of energy use in industrialised economies, it is not surprising that
carbon and energy taxes raise significant amounts of revenue.  However, even rather specific
environmental taxes can raise significant amounts of revenue.  In 1994 the American ‘ozone
depleting chemicals tax’ raised $1 billion.  The ‘water pollution levy’ in the Netherlands20
raised over $750 million in 1993.  Prior to its introduction it was estimated that the UK’s
‘landfill levy’ would generate $280 million.  And finally, Sweden’s ‘nitrogen oxides charge’
raised $72 million in 1992.  (Figures obtained from Gale et al 1995.)
In light of these revenue flows, it is likely that widespread environmental tax reform will be
introduced with a corresponding decrease in other direct or indirect taxes, and/or an
increase in public expenditures.  Indeed, it has been argued that under certain circumstances
such a reform might even generate a ‘double dividend’ whereby the tax reform would
reduce both environmental and economic distortions.  (For a review of the conditions under
which this is likely to take place see Goulder 1994.  Other discussions include Parry 1995,
and Bohm 1997.)  While there have been some debates about the relative likelihood of
revenue recycling resulting in such a ‘double dividend’, there is no question that the form in
which the proceeds from taxes are used will have significant distributional consequences.
Whether or not the combined effect is progressive or regressive will depend upon the
specific characteristics of the fiscal reform proposed and the structure of the economy.  In
general, recycling can take one of three forms: automatic recycling, reducing other taxes, and
increasing expenditures.
Automatic recycling arises from the effect of increased prices for consumer goods and
services on existing benefit schemes, state pensions and other indexed receipts.  (See
Poterba 1991 and Crawford, Smith and Webb 1993.)  To the extent that households will
differ in terms of the proportion of their income which is indexed, automatic recycling will
have distributional consequences.  Moreover, since poorer households tend to receive a
higher proportion of their income as indexed benefits, the effects are likely to be progressive.
However, there are three qualifications which must be made to this argument.  First, since
the aggregate price indices which are used to calculate benefits often assume a lower
proportion of expenditures on necessities than is the case for low-income households, they
will not be compensated fully for environmental taxes which hit necessities (i.e. fuel and
food) particularly hard.  Second, since there is great diversity amongst low-income
households, some households (i.e. those which are not eligible for means-tested benefits)
will face particular hardship.  And, third, since take-up for most schemes is less than 100%,
coverage will be less than universal, even amongst eligible households.
The importance of the appropriate indexing of benefits can be illustrated with reference to
the treatment of food costs in the determination of social security payments in the UK.  The
system is based upon a subsistence scale originally derived from poverty studies conducted
in the 1930s (NCC 1995). Conversely, several European countries (e.g. Sweden,
Netherlands, Norway, Denmark and Ireland) have developed budget standards in which
food and other basic necessities are explicitly taken account of in the determination of state
benefits.  However, of particular relevance to this study is the use of an uprating formula in
the UK system which is based on an inappropriate price index.
21  In such a system the
amount of revenue recycled automatically to lower-income households following the
introduction of ETR in the agricultural sector would be quite different than in continental
European countries.
                                                                
21 Although an earnings index (which tends to rise faster than price indices in a growing economy) was
used in the period 1975-1980.21
The  distributional effects of recycling via reduced taxes and/or increased discretionary
expenditures are more complicated.  In general, indirect taxes tend to be regressive, while
direct taxes and discretionary expenditures tend to be progressive.  Therefore, a reform
whereby the proceeds are recycled via reduced income taxes will tend to have more
adverse (or less beneficial) distributional effects as one whereby the proceeds are recycled
via reduced expenditures on discretionary benefits or reduced value-added-tax.  However,
this will very much depend upon the precise nature of the fiscal reform. For instance, the
revenue may be recycled by increasing tax allowances or marginal rates for the lowest
income band.  Similarly,  it may be recycled by decreasing VAT on goods consumed
disproportionately by poorer households.
Symons, Proops and Gay (1994) estimate the effects in the UK of recycling the revenue
generated by a carbon tax in a number of manners, including reducing or abolishing VAT,
reducing petrol excise duties, and increasing benefits (minimum income provision, increasing
pensions, and increasing child allowances). The reform which comes closest to meeting
environmental objectives (approximately 20% reduction in CO2), distributional objectives
(not significantly exacerbating inequality) and fiscal objectives (approximate revenue
neutrality) is one which involves a 5% rate on VAT, a 30% reduction in petrol excise duties,
a minimum expenditure allowance of £45, an increase in pensions of £15, and an increased
child allowance of £15.
22
Cornwell and Creedy (1996) look at the effects of recycling the revenue generated by the
imposition of a carbon tax in Australia through adjustments in the minimum income
guarantee.  While the direct effect of the tax is regressive, the revenue generated is sufficient
(an increase in the tax ratio from 0.33 to 0.40) to allow for the reversal of the adverse
effects of the tax on income inequality by raising the minimum income guarantee by 50%.
They find similar responses for fuel taxes and food taxes, although in these two cases they
do not include behavioural responses to the price changes.
Other studies have also looked at recycling the revenue from more specific taxes.  For
instance, Crawford, Smith and Webb (1993) look at the distributional effects of recycling
the revenue from the imposition of 17.5% VAT on domestic energy in the UK through a
0.4% increase in all benefits on the one hand and through an equal-cost increase in means-
tested benefits on the other hand.  Not surprisingly, both measures are progressive, but the
latter is significantly more so.
However, not all means of recycling are likely to be progressive. In the case of California,
Walls and Hanson (1996) look at the  distributional effects of recycling the revenue
generated by the imposition of vehicle registration fees based on environmental
characteristics (i.e. estimated emissions).  They find that by using the revenue to abolish the
existing vehicle registration fee system, which is based upon monetary values, the tax change
                                                                
22 The tax rate, however, is much higher (£444), than in reforms which ignore distributional concerns
(£277).  See the next sub-section for a discussion of this issue. Other means of recycling the revenue
either result in large increases in inequality (zero-rating VAT and halving the petrol excise duty) or do
not meet the environmental target (halving petrol excise duty and increasing benefits).22
is likely to have adverse distributional consequences due to the preponderance of less
expensive but older and more polluting cars amongst lower-income households.  In this case
the ‘environmental’ tax is more regressive than the ‘value’ tax which it replaces.
III.D Conclusion
In at least two of the cases examined (energy and agriculture) ETR is likely to have adverse
distributional consequences, at least in terms of direct tax burdens.  This arises from the fact
that domestic energy consumption and food are basic needs, consumed in relatively greater
proportion by lower-income households. In the case of transport ETR is unlikely to have
regressive consequences in terms of tax burdens. This is due to the higher levels of car
ownership for richer households.  Moreover, even for those measures which are regressive
in terms of direct expenditures, the inclusion of indirect expenditures tends to mitigate the
adverse distributional consequences somewhat.
Conversely, in some cases the adverse  distributional consequences of regressive
environmental taxes may be even more unfavourable than is often presumed when taking
into account that poorer households are less able to adjust their consumption patterns in the
face of changing prices.  However, it has also been shown that since environmental taxes
(unlike other environmental policy instruments) raise significant amounts of revenue, some of
the adverse distributional consequences of ETR can be overcome by lowering other taxes or
increasing expenditures.
IV. The Distribution of the Environmental and Social Effects of
Environmental Tax Reform
In this section the distribution of environmental and social effects from ETR will be
discussed.  In both cases the effects are more difficult to quantify since the  consequences
are usually realised in non-monetary form and/or are the outcome of complex interactions in
the economy.  Nonetheless, some general insights can be gained from a close look at the
literature.
IV.A Distribution of Environmental Effects of ETR
Just as it is argued that the costs of environmental tax reform tend to be borne
disproportionately by the poor, it is also often argued that the benefits are realised
disproportionately by the rich. (See Baumol and Oates 1988.)  Part of the reasoning behind
this assertion arises from a belief in the ‘income-elasticity’ of demand for environmental
quality. Thus, it has often been argued that preferences for environmental quality are income-
elastic (i.e. demand for environmental quality rises more than proportionately with income
levels).  According to this view, environmental tax reform implies targeting basic needs in
order to satisfy luxury demands.
23
                                                                
23 To some extent the environmental effects of ETR are just the inverse of the fiscal effects.  If
households respond elastically to changing prices for affected goods then the revenue raised will be
quite small but the environmental benefits will be quite high, and vice versa.  Thus, for a given tax rate,
the elasticity will, in effect, determine the split between fiscal and environmental effects.23
As we have seen, the case for the cost side of this assertion is more complicated when the
full effects of different types of fiscal reform are analysed.  Given the wide variety of
attributes and resources associated with environmental ‘quality’ - i.e. from the health effects
of urban air pollution to the aesthetic value of pristine landscapes - the benefits side of such
an assertion is meaningless at this degree of aggregation.  Moreover, there is increasing
reason to believe that there is not a positive relationship between income levels and
proportional demand for a number of environmental attributes and resources for which one
would imagine such a pattern to exist.
24
More importantly, there is also good reason to believe that actual levels of exposure to
environmental degradation are not uniform across different household groups.  If this is the
case then households will benefit differentially from environmental tax reforms which reduce
environmental damages. In particular, households which are most exposed to pollution
emissions will benefit disproportionately from reduced emissions, since prior to their
reduction they will have borne a disproportionate share of the costs from the emissions.
There are at least two reasons to believe that it is the poor who are most likely to face
significant levels of exposure.  Firstly, to the extent that property prices rise with income
levels, wealthier households appear to be willing to ‘insulate’ themselves from environmental
degradation.  Secondly, higher income levels do give some households the opportunity to
‘buy’ environmental quality (i.e. through holidays, private gardens or second homes) even
when their local environment is degraded.
Exposure to Toxic Pollutants
Regrettably, due to data constraints there is very little empirical work on this question in the
case study sectors chosen.  However, in recent years there has been a spate of studies in the
United States examining the relationship between the spatial distribution of toxic releases
from industrial plants - usually using the US EPA’s ‘Toxic Releases Inventory’ - and the
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of surrounding neighbourhoods. (See
Arora and Cason 1996 and Brooks and Seith 1997 for two examples.)  In general, the
studies find that the lowest income group has the highest degree of exposure and the highest
income group has the lowest degree of exposure. (See Figure 7 for some results from
Brooks and Seith 1997.)  For instance, those below the officially-defined poverty line in the
US faced exposure levels 16% higher than those above the poverty line. Not surprisingly,
the studies also find that urban households are more exposed than rural households.
25
Figure 7
                                                                
24 For instance, in a review (Kristrom and Riera 1996) of empirical studies of a variety of environmental
indicators (wetlands, forests, water quality, etc ...) it was found that preferences for public
environmental quality declined as a proportion of income with increased income levels.
25 More controversially, the studies also examine the effects of different racial characteristics.  In terms
of exposure, Brooks and Seith (1997) find that levels are 72% higher for African Americans than whites.
However, the econometric results which control the effects of other variables (i.e. percentage urban
population) are ambiguous. Brooks and Seith (1997) find that exposure increases with the proportion of
African-American residents, while Arora and Cason (1996) find that emissions decrease with the
proportion of ‘non-white’ households until a high proportion is reached.24






















































However, in the econometric analyses undertaken in both studies they do not find that
income levels are systematically related to exposure to toxic releases (except for the very
highest income groups) when the effects of other factors are included in the analysis.  This
implies that while there is some degree of (negative) correlation between levels of exposure
and income levels, this relationship is largely attributable to other related factors such as the
relative income levels of urban versus rural household levels.
Exposure to Pollution from the Transport Sector
Due to the diffuse nature of most environmental damages from residential and industrial
energy consumption, it is not surprising that little work has been carried out on the social
distribution of its impacts.  However, there has been some work on exposure and health
impacts from pollution originating from vehicles.  For instance, Read (1994) reports on
studies carried out in the United States and in Germany which find that children are
particularly vulnerable.  Whitelegg (1993) reports on a  study which found that pre-
adolescent children, people over 65, and pregnant women were most at risk.  Thus, these
groups are likely to benefit most from ETR that shifts people out of cars and onto other
modes of transport.
While interesting, such studies do not distinguish between different socio-economic groups,
but rather try to identify those members of society who are most likely to be at risk from
vehicular pollution emissions and not the extent of exposure per se.  Given differences in the
density of car use it is clear that rural households will tend to benefit rather less than urban
households. (For evidence from two rather dated studies in the United States see Harrison
1974 and Gianessi et al 1979.) Thus to some extent relative wealth of urban and rural
households will capture some of these effects, but there are few studies which have looked
systematically at exposure to pollution across socio-economic classifications.
To cast some initial light on the degree of exposure for different socio-economic
classifications within individual cities, data was obtained on air quality (ozone, NOx and25
SOx) at borough level in London (SEIPH 1996).  This was compared with average earnings
and average house price.  (See Table 6.)  The former gives a very rough indication of the
degree of exposure in the area surrounding the work-place, while the latter gives some
indication of the degree of exposure in the area around the home.  While the variables are
far from ideal,
26 alternatives are not readily available.
Table 6
Economic Wealth and Air Quality in London Boroughs
Avg Weekly
Earnings




(2nd Q 1996 -
£1000's)
Ozone NOx SOx
City of London 653 NA 333 208 341
Barking 422 45.5 325 307
Bexley 378 59.4 325 330 330
Brent 387 67.0 120
Bromley 347 75.7 336
Ealing 412 90.1 264 261 269
Enfield 375 61.4 203
Greenwich 367 69.0 312 163 329
Hackney 509 68.7 336 302
Hillingdon 456 65.5 90 275 89
Islington 477 127.6 30
Kingston 409 82.1 253
Southwark 453 73.6 322 217 342
Sutton 384 65.8 189 266
Tower Hamlets 496 92.1 323 194 322
Wandsworth 392 103.5 340 307
Westminster 510 133.1 254 295 252
Sources: Earnings from UK ONS (1996), House Prices from LRC (1996) and Air Quality from SEIPH (1996).
It was found that in two out of three cases (ozone and SOx) air quality - measured in terms
of the number of days in which pollution concentrations were in the ‘very good’ band
established by the EU - was positively (but very weakly) correlated with the average weekly
earnings and house prices.  (See Table 7.)  To a limited degree this implies that ‘poorer’
areas suffer disproportionately from exposure to air pollution and would, thus, benefit
disproportionately from improvements in air quality arising from reduced vehicle traffic.
Moreover, since poorer households are much less likely to own cars, they contribute very
little to the adverse environmental and health impacts from vehicular air pollution.  In 1995-
1996 only 18.2% of households in the lowest income decile in the UK had a car, while the
                                                                
26 The earnings data would, of course, omit the majority of the population who are not in full-time
employment and the house price data is only a very imperfect proxy for relative wealth of residents of
neighbourhoods.  Moreover, comparing both sets of data with air quality indicators at this level of
aggregation is clearly inadequate since there can be huge variations in both environmental and socio-
economic conditions within individual boroughs.  Thus, figures are at most illustrative.
27 Only background readings are included.  Observations from roadside readings are excluded since they
are fewer in number and not comparable with background readings.  Boroughs with more than one
reading were averaged.26
figure for the top three deciles were all greater than 90% (UK ONS 1996).  Thus, to a great
extent poorer households are being exposed to pollution generated by richer households.
Table 7
Correlation Coefficients Between Economic and Environmental Indicators
Earnings House Prices




Environmental Effects from the Agriculture Sector
The distribution of environmental benefits from ETR in the agriculture sector takes two
primary forms:  improved ambient environmental quality and reduced exposure to chemical
residues in agricultural products themselves.
28  With respect to ambient environmental
benefits, the two most important consequences are probably in terms of water quality and
the effect of the sector on natural landscapes. Other factors such as the contribution of
ammonia emissions from livestock to acid rain can be significant in some areas.
The contamination of ground and surface water caused by fertiliser and pesticide application
seem to be major hazards to human health.
29  To some extent all members of society benefit
from unpolluted clean water. However, those who are near polluted surface waters (or
source their water from surface waters polluted by agricultural runoff) would benefit more
from reduced discharges from agricultural runoff.  In particular, communities in countries that
do not have universal water treatment, will enjoy important health benefits from reduced
agricultural pollution.
In communities with water treatment facilities the financial benefits may be considerable.  For
instance  Ward  et al (1993) estimated that substituting one herbicide with another
(isoproturon with fenoxaprop-ethyl) saved £800 million in water treatment capital costs and
£80 million in annual operating costs.  It has also been estimated that removing pesticides
from drinking water costs £800 million per year (WWF/CPRE 1996).  Since water
connection fees and tariffs represent a higher proportion of expenditures for poorer
households, environmental taxes may be progressive insofar as water charges are reduced,
disproportionately benefiting poorer households.  (See Herrington 1997).
Adverse ambient environmental effects from agricultural production will also reduce the
value of the countryside environment for non-consumptive uses.  For instance, opportunities
for recreation may be adversely affected and the contamination of oceans, seas, lakes and
fresh water by effluents from agriculture contributes to the destruction of wildlife and their
                                                                
28 Health effects arising from the effects of ETR on the price (and thus consumption levels) of food,
rather than its quality, will be discussed below.
29 The UK Department of the Environment (1986) estimated that 1 million people in the UK were regularly
receiving drinking water that exceeded the 50 mg of nitrates per litre target set in an EC directive.  In 1990
192 water courses in the UK exceeded the limit (WWF/CPRE 1995).27
habitats (Miranowski 1983, Liapis 1994, Libby and Boggess 1990).  The distributional
consequences are complex.  On the one hand, rural residents are likely to benefit more than
urban households from the enhanced environment which will accompany effective ETR.  On
the other hand, amongst urban residents, the major beneficiaries of these opportunities may
well be rich households due to their greater ability to gain access to improved rural
landscapes.  However, WWF/CPRE (1996) report that approximately 60% of the
population “visit” rural landscapes at least once a year, indicating that the benefits of
improved landscapes are relatively widely distributed.
Similarly, both rural and urban residents are likely to benefit from reductions in chemical
residues in foods.  However,  the benefits from reduced exposure to pesticides (in
application) will be exclusively enjoyed by rural households. Therefore, it is likely that
reduced environmental pollution will benefit rural residents more than their urban
counterparts.  Furthermore, since people employed directly in the agriculture sector are
likely to be poor relative to the average, the overall  distributional effects of controlling
agricultural pollution will be progressive.  For instance in the UK in 1996 male “manual”
workers in the agricultural sector had an annual income that was 81% of the national
average for all workers (ONS NES 1996).  The figures for male “non-manual” (78%) and
female “manual” (93%) workers were also lower than the average.  (The sample size was
too small to give a reliable figure for female “non-manual” workers in the sector.)  Thus, the
distribution of health benefits in the sector may be progressive for society as a whole,
particularly since occupational health concerns can be significant.  For instance, mortality
rates from exposure to pesticides vary from 1% to 9% of cases presented for treatment.
The global number of such cases each year has been estimated at between 1 to 3 million
(WHO 1992).
IV.B Distribution of Social Effects of ETR
The social effects of environmental tax reform are manifold, and in this section some of the
main issues - such as access to dwelling warmth, avoidance of traffic accidents, and access
to a sufficiently nutritious diet - will be reviewed.  In addition, the employment effects which
are likely to arise from ETR will be reviewed.
Energy
As noted in Section III, the fiscal consequences of taxes on domestic fuels - whether in the
form of sales taxes or through a broader carbon or energy tax - are generally regressive,
unless accompanied by a form of revenue recycling which explicitly favours the poorest.
Moreover, there are good reasons to believe that the consequences in terms of health are
also regressive.  For instance, in their analysis of the effects of VAT on domestic fuel in the
UK Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) estimate that the lowest deciles will reduce fuel
consumption by 9.6% and 9.5%, while the average decrease for all households is only
4.1%.  In a later study using the same model, Crawford, Webb and Smith (1993) found that
following the introduction of VAT on domestic fuel at 17.5% the lowest quintile would
reduce energy consumption by just over 9%, while the richest quintile would reduce
consumption by only 1.0%.28
The implications of this for the poorest households are quite significant since average indoor
temperatures in the lowest socio-economic categories of household are already lower than
in richer households.  Figure 8 presents data on average indoor temperature levels for
different income brackets in the UK in 1991 (UK DOE 1996).  While living-room
temperatures do not vary markedly, hall temperatures (which are a good proxy for average
house temperatures) exhibit a marked increase with income levels.  Moreover, the variance
is much higher for the lowest-income bracket, meaning that some households live in
extremely cold dwellings.  An earlier report (UK DOE 1991) found that well over one in
five households in the lowest income bracket had an average indoor temperature of less than
12
0.  In many cases residents of these households are least able to withstand such
temperatures.  For instance, the SAP rating for private tenants over the age of 85 is 12.2
0,
one-third of the average for all households (UK DOE 1996).
Figure 8


































































































Moreover, as noted in Section III lower-income households are particularly ill-equipped to
undertake the kinds of investment needed to increase energy efficiency (i.e. invest in more
efficient heating equipment and insulation measures), and as such the drop in energy
consumption is more likely to be directly reflected in corresponding drops in temperature.
For such households any drop in indoor temperature will be reflected not only in terms of
reduced comfort but, in many cases, also in terms of adverse health impacts.  As such, the
drop in temperature should not be seen as a reflection of household consumer preferences in
the face of changing prices, but rather as a reflection of their inability to meet basic needs.
Many poorer households spend as much on fuel as they are able to and any increase in price
can only be reflected in reduced consumption.
Transport29
Similar issues arise in the case of transport, where the principal non-pollution benefits from
ETR are related to reduced noise, congestion, and accidents from the use of private road
vehicles.  It has been estimated that in the UK the marginal external costs can be as high as
£19.1 billion for congestion, £2.6-£3.1 billion for noise, and £2.9-£9.4 for accidents
(Maddison et al 1996).  Unfortunately, there is little evidence on the distribution of these
benefits by different socio-economic classifications.
However, in the case of congestion the primary beneficiaries are likely to be the users of the
roads themselves. Since some of the costs of congestion are internal, some of the benefits
from its reduction will also be internal.  For instance, an American study found that internal
‘user time’ costs per vehicle mile in the United States were more than five times greater than
external congestion costs (Litman 1995).  Moreover, since car drivers and passengers are
generally wealthier than average this implies that the benefits are likely to be regressive.
However, users of public transport modes - who are generally less wealthy than car
drivers
30 - will also benefit to some extent, through reduced journey times.
Table 8
Fatalities from Motor Vehicle Traffic Accidents in the UK in 1994
Vehicle-Vehicle Accident
Driver of Vehicle 578 17.88%









Driver of Vehicle 411 12.72%
Passenger of Vehicle 261 8.08%
Motorcyclist 142 4.39%
Other 210 6.50%
The same is true of accidents to the extent that a large proportion of accidents are between
pairs of vehicles, and thus the distribution of benefits would be largely proportional to the
costs borne.  However, users of public transport, cyclists and pedestrians will also benefit to
a great extent since they currently bear some of the costs.  For instance, in the UK in 1994
136 (4.2%) and 994 (30.8%) of the 3,232 traffic accident fatalities involving motor vehicles
were cyclists and pedestrians respectively (UK OPCS 1996).  (See Table 8.)
Accident rates by socio-economic classification are more difficult to quantify. In a recent
study by Roberts and Power (1996), death rates for children from traffic-related accidents
                                                                
30 The percentage of expenditures on public transport fares relative to expenditures on private motoring
costs was just under 40% for the lowest decile in the UK in 1995-1996, while the figure for the highest
decile was 16% (UK ONS 1997).30
are compared by OPCS-defined occupational social classes for the period 1989-1992.
(See Figure 9.)  The figures are lower for the more advantaged classes (i.e. classes I and II)
relative to the more disadvantaged classes (i.e. classes IV and V).
31  (The “other” category
comprises households where the household head is “unoccupied”, in the armed forces, or
where insufficient information was provided.)  Children in class V are over four times as
likely to die from a traffic-related accident than children in classes I or II.  Moreover, the
degree of inequality in vulnerability appears to be increasing.  For instance, the ratio of death
rates for classes V and I was 1.8:1 in 1979-1983, but 4.2:1 in 1989-1992.  For pedestrian
deaths the ratio was 4.3:1 in 1979-1983 and 5.1:1 in 1989-1992.
Figure 9
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Some of the most important social effects of ETR in the transport sector are likely to arise
from changes in access to mobility.  To the extent that environmental taxes on private motor
transport are indicative of a more general shift away from land use patterns based around
the car relative to other transport modes, this would tend to benefit poorer households who
do not own cars and whose mobility has been restricted by the emphasis on the car in recent
decades. To the extent that ‘mobility’ is a wider social need, the social consequences of
such development patterns is significant.  (See ECMT/OECD 1994 and Whitelegg 1993.).
This argument is particularly relevant in countries such as the UK with the deregulation of
public transport services and the increasingly extended nature of development patterns.
However, while it can be argued that some groups may find their mobility enhanced
following the introduction of ETR, there is little question that rural inhabitants will be
adversely affected.  Car ownership in some rural areas is effectively forced, and thus rural
households have few alternatives but to bear the costs (ECMT/OECD 1994).  For instance,
Casler and Rafiqui (1993) find that rural households would be hardest hit by petrol taxes in
Australia, spending almost 7% of total expenditures on petrol (direct and indirect
                                                                
31 The classifications are as follows: I professional occupations, II managerial and technical
occupations, III skilled (N) non-manual and (M) manual occupations, IV partly-skilled occupations, and
V unskilled occupations.31
consumption), relative to just over 5% for urban households. Johnson, McKay and Smith
(1990) estimate that following the introduction of an increase in the petrol duty in the UK,
rural households would face the largest increase in taxes and the largest decrease in petrol
consumption.
Agriculture
The distribution of the social consequences of ETR in the agriculture sector may also be
severe. Indeed, it has been estimated that the poor in the UK would have to spend more
than 40% of their incomes on food in order to purchase a ‘healthy diet’ as set out in
government guidelines (NCC 1995). This suggests that the food that poor households
currently purchase with 25.2% of their income (see Section III) does not provide adequate
nutrition.
Thus, without any improvements in their economic means following ETR in the agriculture
sector, these groups would simply have to absorb the price increases, reduce calorie intake
or switch to an even less nutritional diet.  Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) estimate that a
5% increase in food prices would result in a decrease in food consumption of approximately
4% for the lowest decile.  While other deciles face similar decreases, the consequences in
nutritional terms are likely to be much greater for lower-income households since their diets
are already insufficient.  Perhaps most distressingly, households with children and retired
persons - those most vulnerable to dietary deficiencies - face the biggest falls in
consumption.
The situation may be worse still, since poor households appear to be dependent on cheap
foods that are high in calorific content but may be of limited nutritional value (NCC 1995).
Comparing relative expenditures on different food types (UK ONS 1996) with their relative
calorific contents for a given cost (NCC 1995) reveals that there is some bias amongst low-
income households towards foods which are relatively inexpensive but filling (i.e. potatoes
and bread), relative to others which are nutritious but more expensive per calorie (i.e. fruit
and vegetables).  (Table 9.)  To some extent, it would appear that low-income households
are already being forced to substitute foods of relatively lower nutritional value in an effort to
meet calorific requirements.
Table 9
The Calorific Content of Selected Foods and Expenditure Patterns by Decile
Pence/ As % of Food Expenditures As % of Total Expenditures
100 Cals D1 D10 D1 D10
Potatoes 3p 3.95% 2.98% 0.83% 0.27%
Bread 4p - 7p 5.79% 4.31% 1.22% 0.39%
Fruit 19p - 30p 5.96% 7.31% 1.25% 0.66%
Vegetables 20p - 103 p 7.85% 8.91% 1.65% 0.81%
Whether or not ETR has a significantly adverse effect on the diets of the poorest households
will depend upon the correlation between the environment-intensity of different food types,
the proportional consumption of different food types, and their nutritional value.  In some
cases, efforts to address environmental problems may also yield health benefits as healthier32
food types become relatively less expensive. Similarly, within individual food types ETR may
result in cultivation practices with positive health consequences (e.g. fewer chemical
residues).  However, this is clearly not always the case.  For instance, the primary
motivation behind the application of some inputs with adverse consequences for the ambient
environment has been concern about consumer health.
Employment Costs
Other important social effects arise from the  sectoral and regional  dislocation which
accompanies any significant policy reform.  While in some cases these effects may be
temporary, as capital and labour shift from particular sectors and areas, the transitional costs
for certain groups can be considerable in the interim (OECD 1994b).  In particular, the
employment effects of changes in the economy accompanying ETR may be considerable.
32
These costs will be particularly high if some regions specialise in a narrow range of
environment-intensive sectors, since other employment opportunities will be few. Moreover,
although the costs are likely to be highest in the short- and medium-term, they may persist as
long-term unemployment becomes entrenched in particular regions.  Conversely, employees
in other areas are likely to benefit, finding demand for their skills, resources and products
very high.  DeWitt et al (1991 in OECD 1994b) find that the regional effects of a carbon
tax can vary by as much as 50% in the nine census regions in the United States.  Osten et al
(1991 in OECD 1994b) find similar results for Canada, with Alberta’s economy hardest hit
due to its concentration in carbon-intensive sectors.
Using a model of the UK economy, Barker (1997) looks at the sectoral and employment
effects of a carbon/energy tax in the EU and finds quite different effects.  Most pertinently,
while a number of sectors show falls in aggregate output (i.e. the energy sectors, car
manufacturing, pharmaceuticals and chemicals, transport, textiles and apparel, etc..), none of
these sectors show falls in employment.  This is largely a consequence of the assumption that
the revenue is recycled via reduced lower non-wage labour costs.  Thus, even in those
sectors in which output falls, incentives to increase employment are more than sufficient to
counterbalance this effect.  Similarly, in a comparison of different policy scenarios (and
model specifications)  Mabey and Nixon (1997) show that the employment effects of
introducing a carbon tax sufficient to stabilise emissions at 1990 levels differ significantly
depending on whether the revenue is recycled via reduced income taxes or employers’
national insurance contributions.  In the latter case employment rises by as much as 3% for
one of the applications.
33  These results highlight the importance of using appropriate
recycling to mitigate any adverse social consequences of ETR.  This is particularly important
in the EU where labour is much less mobile than in North America.
These issues are of even greater importance in agriculture since the usual assumption of
mobility is less applicable than it is in many other sectors in the economy for a number of
                                                                
32 For discussions of the effects on other groups (i.e. shareholders, etc ...) see Smith (1992) and OECD
(1994b).
33 Although discrepancies in the results depending upon the model specification reveal the inherent
uncertainty associated with estimating such effects.33
reasons: the skills required in the sector are less readily transferable; workers in the sector
are often quite far removed from other job opportunities; the average level of education in
the agricultural labour force is less than that in other sectors; and, governments of
industrialised countries have traditionally invested less in rural education and in training
people in rural communities for alternative employment opportunities. As a result, people
employed on farms have fewer alternative employment opportunities and the effects of
environmental taxation on agricultural employment and income are likely to be much higher.
Thus, Wu et al (1995) predict that the imposition of nitrogen or irrigation water taxes set
high enough
34 to reduce nitrate losses by 5% cent would cause farm income losses of
between 20 and 35%. Liapis (1994) reports that a 50% tax on fertiliser inputs would reduce
EU farm incomes by 7.3%, which is lower down on the spectrum of estimated farm income
losses. Rendleman (1991) predicts a reduction in returns to labour of about 0.7% from a
nitrogen tax of 150% in Norway.  However, the small size of this reduction in the returns to
labour is mainly due to the assumption of high labour mobility.
35
Employees in downstream manufacturing sectors will also be affected.  McCorriston and
Sheldon (1989) noted that while the burden of a fertiliser tax in the UK falls largely on the
farmers, fertiliser firms are also affected.  Rendleman (1991) evaluates the wider economic
effects of  policies such as input taxes  that would bring an across-the-board 75% cent
reduction in agricultural chemical use for the US. He finds that the reduction would cause
significant production changes especially in the farm sectors and downstream industries.
Feed grains and oilseeds sectors suffer the highest (-20.4%) contraction in output.  Other
farm sectors also suffer significant contractions.  However, manufacturing output also falls by
-0.8%.  In particular, the livestock and feed grains/oilseeds processing industries would
suffer output contractions by -2.4% and -7.9% respectively. Conversely, Tobey and Reinert
(1991) show that an agricultural policy reform which causes a reduction in fertiliser use will
increase output and employment in the manufacturing sector.
However, while it is true that ETR in the agriculture sector will be felt in terms of reduced
employment in some upstream and downstream industries, its effects on the means by which
agricultural goods are produced may result in increased employment in parts of the sector
itself since in many cases polluting inputs are substitutes for labour inputs.  For instance
WWF/CPRE (1996) report that “integrated crop management” is labour-intensive.
Lampkin (1990) provides data for organic farming in Switzerland, Germany and the
Netherlands indicating that it is generally more labour-intensive than conventional farming,
but it is not clear that the effects of different crop mixes are adequately addressed in the
studies cited.  Thus, while the precise consequences will depend upon the reform
introduced, it is quite likely that by targeting some of the more environment-intensive crops
and production processes, more labour-intensive systems (such as organic agriculture and
                                                                
34It is estimated that for 5% reduction in nitrate loss the tax rates 85% and 313% have to be imposed
respectively in the North and South subregions.
35 Dubgaard (1990) predicts that agricultural land rent in Norway would decrease by 25% or more with
the use of nitrogen taxes of 150%. The study by Rendleman (1991) cited above also predicted a decrease
in land rent of 34% and 21% for land under fruit and vegetable production and for land under feed grain
production, respectively.34
integrated pest management) will benefit.  This may mitigate some of the adverse social
consequences discussed above.
IV.C Conclusions
The distribution of the effects of environmental taxes depend largely upon the precise reform
introduced as well as the environmental indicator.  For global pollutants such as carbon
dioxide and other greenhouse gases from all three sectors the issue is only relevant to a
limited extent at the national level.  However, for other concerns (i.e. exposure to local
airborne pollution from the transport sector, polluted agricultural runoff in surface waters,
improved environmental amenities) poorer households stand to gain a great deal from the
environmental benefits arising from many forms of ETR.  Whether or not their gains exceed
those realised by richer households varies upon the environmental indicator and the policy
reform, but contrary to common assertion it is clear that environmental benefits are not a
‘luxury’ demand enjoyed only by the rich.
In social terms, there is little question that some lower-income households may face
significant hardship for many forms of ETR.  For instance, dwelling temperatures may fall for
members of households which are already suffering from the cold.  Similarly, diets may
suffer for those who already have an insufficiently nutritious diet.  ETR in the transport sector
may result in some poorer households in outlying areas having their mobility restricted.
Conversely, other benefits such as reduced exposure to traffic accidents and traffic noise are
likely to be realised disproportionately by poorer households.
V. Reconciling the Economic, Environmental and Social Effects
of Environmental Tax Reform
The preceding sections illustrate the importance of addressing distributional consequences
when introducing environmental tax reforms.  Both the costs and benefits from introducing
ETR differ widely across different groups within society.  Moreover, as ETR starts to play a
larger role in the economy these differences will become more marked.  Thus, it is important
to ensure that ETR is not only economically and environmentally efficient, but also fair.  If
this is not the case then proposed measures will neither be politically feasible nor socially
desirable.
Unfortunately, in many cases it appears that the twin objectives of fairness and efficiency are
often in conflict, with the most efficient measures often being the most inequitable, and the
most equitable measures often being the most inefficient.  For instance, in the study cited
above by Symons, Proops and Gay (1994), due to the environmental inefficiency of the
non-regressive tax reform, the carbon tax rate would have to be £444/ton.  This is
considerably higher than would be the case if social objectives were ignored entirely
(£277/ton), while still meeting the revenue neutrality constraint.  Similarly, Johnson, McKay
and Smith (1990) show that the most equitable form of redistribution of energy taxes (i.e.
lump-sum payments) is the most inefficient.  The problem is that some of the measures which
have been proposed (and applied) in order to mitigate the adverse distributional effects of35
ETR (i.e. transfer payments) often undermine the environmental effectiveness of the measure
itself.
However, this apparent contradiction between the equity and efficiency aspects of ETR can
be overcome.  The combined effects of the existence of market failures and barriers in the
market for many goods which are environment-intensive and which are of considerable
importance to poorer households, as well as the large amount of revenue raised by many
environmental taxes, raises the possibility of introducing specific measures which increase
economic efficiency, address environmental degradation, and reduce distributional inequality.
ETR which is both effective and fair not only needs to change prices in the market, but also
to change the way households respond to changing prices in the market.
For instance, it is clear that there are significant efficiency gains to be realised in the domestic
energy sector. Nonetheless, such opportunities may not be realised in the existing market for
energy and relative price changes may not be sufficient to encourage more efficient energy
use, both in terms of overall fuel use and in terms of the fuel mix. This is particularly true for
poorer households.  Thus, the exclusive use of price mechanisms may not be appropriate.
The key to a successful policy in terms of both efficiency and equity objectives rests with the
ability of policy makers to institute a programme which changes the characteristics of the
market itself.
Barker and Johnstone (1993) analysed the effects of the joint introduction in the UK of a
carbon/energy tax and a government-sponsored home insulation  programme which
encourages energy conservation amongst low-income households.  This was compared with
a policy which uses standard lump-sum benefits to redress any adverse welfare effects on
low-income households.  The size of compensation was that amount of support required to
return low-income households to their pre-tax consumption patterns.  Assuming that low-
income households respond to changed relative prices in the same way as households on
average, they would require compensation equal to £282.1 million in the year 2000 (Table
10, Row 1).
Table 10
The Distributional Effects of a Carbon Tax Under Different Recycling Scenarios
1995 2000 2005
Price Response Only 141.6 282.1 170.4
Plus Insulation Programme 48.4 -341.4 -725.2
Source: Barker and Johnstone (1993). £ mn (1992 prices) difference in expenditures from base case for low-
income households.
Given the relatively greater importance of capital constraints and tenancy disincentives
amongst lower income households, this figure certainly underestimates the extent of
compensation.  If, however, an energy-efficiency programme were instituted rather than
direct transfer payments for fuel consumption, the level of compensation required would fall.
A simulation of such a programme was introduced into the model in order to evaluate its36
relative merits.
36  Since the effect of the programme would be to encourage conservation,
low-income households could conceivably consume less fuel and not require any
compensation in order to retain welfare levels. In fact, they would experience a net increase
in disposable income of £341.4 million by 2000 and £725.2 million by 2005 (constant 1992
£).
The difference between the effects of the two programmes results from the fact that under
the lump-sum scheme the government will pay (indefinitely) for continued inefficient energy
consumption patterns of low-income households, whereas under the energy-efficiency
programme the government is investing in measures which reduce expenditures (for the
working-life of the investments). The overall increase in efficiency is illustrated by the fact
that the government's own payback period for the energy-efficiency programme relative to
lump-sum benefit redistribution is just under four years.  Thus, under well-designed
environmental tax reforms, efficiency and equity can be complementary objectives, even for
those sectors in which the financial incidence of taxes is likely to be regressive.
Balancing efficiency and equity objectives is also possible when dealing with environmental
problems in the agriculture sector.  For instance, it has been estimated that the market
distortions created by the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) have increased food prices
for the average UK household by as much as £10/week (SSF/CPRE 1995).  To the extent
that distortions arising from the CAP have also resulted in environment-intensive cultivation
practices, both efficiency and equity objectives can be achieved through the removal of
subsidies with adverse environmental consequences.  Moreover, within the agriculture sector
itself, it has been argued that the CAP has benefited larger farms with more intensive
cultivation practices disproportionately relative to smaller farms, a point recognised by the
Commission itself prior to the 1992 MacSharry “reforms”.   (See Swinbank and Tanner
1992 and Whitby 1994.)
However, there is little question that the distributional and social effects of introducing other
measures which increase food prices and reduce agricultural employment may be significant,
and thus the mechanisms designed to alleviate the adverse effects should form an important
component of their design and implementation.  At the most basic level, social security
benefits must be fully indexed to the actual cost of food for low-income households and
constitute a pre-condition for the formulation of policies to control agricultural pollution.
Additional transfer mechanisms are also required to compensate vulnerable households
which are not eligible for social security benefits but which nonetheless would be adversely
affected by higher food costs.  For instance, given the vulnerability of children to dietary
deficiencies Johnson, McKay and Smith (1990) advocate increased access to free school
meals.
Such compensatory policies may not only be equitable, but efficient since they are in both
the short- and long-term national interest.  For instance, a NCC report states that nutritional
inadequacies exist in the diets of many families living on state benefits in the UK (National
                                                                
36According to a source in the electricity industry, a £1.1 billion once-and-for-all  programme of
conservation measures geared toward low-income households instituted in 2000 would result in a
reduction of 170 million therms in low-income quintile energy use in 2001 and all subsequent years.37
Consumer Council (NCC) 1995). A detailed study conducted in Leeds shows that  85% of
the variance by ward  in morbidity before age 65 can be explained in terms of material
deprivation (NCC 1995).  The long-run efficiency of ensuring that vulnerable households are
compensated for the adverse consequences which may accompany higher food prices is
reflected in the fact that there appears to be a high correlation between low birth-weight and
the nutrient intake of expectant mothers.  Moreover, the adverse health effects of low birth
weight may persist for years (NCC 1995).  Thus, any financial savings which accrue to the
Department of Social Security due to inadequate compensation is likely to be more than
counterbalanced by higher expenditures borne by the National Health Service, to say
nothing of the costs borne by low-income households in terms of quality of life.
Given the present level of subsidies received by farmers in the EU, some contraction in
output and some dislocation amongst agricultural workers is inevitable.  However, measures
should be introduced which maximise the environmental benefits and minimise the social
costs arising from such structural changes.  In particular, it is important to recognise that
there may be huge opportunity costs associated with improvement in the environment
without simultaneously correcting other sources of market failure.  For instance, some of the
studies cited above (for example Weaver et al 1996 and Taylor et al 1992) indicate that
significant reductions in agricultural pollution could be achieved through changes in cultivation
practices at little or no cost through the removal of perverse subsidies.  Schemes could be
used to transfer income back to farmers while at the same time encouraging more
environmentally friendly practices.
Conversely, the distributional effects of ETR in the transport sector are likely to be less
adverse than in the residential and agricultural sectors.  However, even in this case the
efficiency of ETR can be improved by more enlightened forms of recycling since, as in the
other two cases, there are numerous market failures and barriers in the sector.  In particular,
households will respond more elastically to increased petrol prices if their public transport
options are improved.  Not only will this allow for greater reductions in emissions from the
sector, but the social benefits may be important in terms of increased mobility for particular
groups of households who rely upon public transport and who have suffered in recent
decades from patterns of development which revolve around the use of private automobiles.
VI. Conclusion
This report has examined the distributional effects of environmental tax reform, focusing on
measures designed to reduce pollution emissions from the energy, transport and agriculture
sectors.  The report emphasises that in at least two cases (energy and agriculture) ETR is
likely to have adverse distributional consequences, at least in terms of direct tax burdens.
This arises from the fact that domestic energy consumption and food are basic needs,
consumed in relatively greater proportion by lower-income households.  Moreover, the
distributional consequences in these sectors may be even more adverse when it is
recognised that poorer households may be less able to adjust consumption patterns in the
face of changing prices.  However, it has also been emphasised that since environmental
taxes (unlike other environmental policy instruments) raise significant revenue, some of the38
adverse distributional consequences of ETR can be overcome by lowering other taxes or
increasing expenditures.
The report has also examined the distribution of the environmental and social consequences
of ETR in the three sectors.  While the effects depend largely upon the precise reform
introduced, it is clear that in many senses (i.e. exposure to pollution, improved environmental
amenities) poorer households stand to gain a great deal from the environmental benefits
arising from ETR.  Whether or not their gains exceed those realised by richer households
varies upon the environmental indicator and the policy reform, but it is clear that many
environmental benefits are not enjoyed disproportionately by wealthier households.  In social
terms, there is no question that some lower-income households may face significant
hardship.  For instance, dwelling temperatures may fall and dietary requirements may not be
met satisfactorily.  Conversely, other reduced benefits such as exposure to traffic accidents
are likely to be realised disproportionately by poorer households.
However, the  distributional  consequences which arise from some environmental tax
measures should not be used as a pretext to delay or restrict their introduction.  Instead,
measures to mitigate their adverse distributional consequences should be integrated fully into
the policy reform.  Thus, rather than addressing distributional consequences in an ad hoc
and  ex post manner
37 they should be addressed systematically, recognising the
characteristics of the sectors and households affected. Given the prevalence of market
imperfections in many environment-intensive sectors and the particular constraints faced by
low-income households, in many instances it will be possible to realise both environmental
and distributional objectives in a manner which is economically efficient.
                                                                
37 The recent Labour initiative to provide as much as £50 for some low-income households to cover
winter fuel costs is indicative of such a policy, particularly since the concomitant fall in VAT in
insulation only applies to a small sub-set of households which are involved in government energy
efficiency schemes.39
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